Dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia
Following the introduction of neuroleptics, the earliest indication of their mode of action suggested that they blocked catecholamine neurotransmission1.
It was subsequently suggested-that dopamine was likely to be the pertinent catecholamine; a suggestion supported by findings that neuroleptic activity was correlated with dopamine receptor blockade". Findings that neuroleptics inhibited the production of dopamine sensitive adenylate cyclase supported the notion that they acted to blockade dopamine receptors. However, while such findings held for phenothiazine and thioxanthene compounds, they did not appear to hold for butyrophrenone compounds, a discrepancy which was resolved with the development of a D2 receptor assay. Subsequent studies clearly indicated that clinical potency of neuroleptics correlated well with the ability to bind to D2 receptors", This was complemented by findings of Johnstone et al. 5 who compared the efficacies of cisand transisomers of flupenthixol. They found that the cis-isomer, which differs from the trans-isomer in binding to D2 receptors while both bind to noradrenergic, cholinergic and opiate receptors, also differed from the trans-isomer in being clinically potent.
Given that neuroleptic activity correlates closely with D2 receptor blockade and thereby with blockade of dopamine neurotransmission and given the clinical utility of these drugs in the treatment of schizophrenia, the evolution of a dopamine and subsequently a dopamine receptor hypothesis of schizophrenia" is not surprising. Supporting the hypothesis were findings that amphetamine abuse frequently led to a schizophreniform psychosis", that amphetamine aggravates schizophrenic psychoses", that this exacerbation can be treated with neuroleptics" and that amphetamine enhanced dopamine release in the brain", In addition, postmortem studies have indicated an increased number of D2 receptors in the brains of schizophrenic patients (although prior neuroleptic treatment makes the results from these studies ambiguousi'", A recent PET scan study of drug naive schizophrenics has also reported an increase in D2 reteptor number!', There are problems however over the technique used in this study and the drug naivety of the subjects and the findings were not replicated by Farde et al 12 . As well as leading to identification of a likely subcellular site of neuroleptic activity, the dopamine hypothesis has stimulated research into neuropsychological functions, whose modification by D2 blockade might be therapeutic. As the function of the nigrostriatal dopaminergic pathways appears to be predominantly motor, this has not seemed to be the correct site for an antischizophrenic locus of action.
Some progress was made towards this with the differentiation of a mesolimbic dopamine projection arising from the ventral tegmentum and projecting to the nucleus accumbens'v and the demonstration that this system mediates more complex behaviours than those associated with the nigrostriatal pathway and in particular is involved in the functioning of an incentive motivational system-s. However, as there is no consensus to date on any lesion in this system in schizophrenic subjects, pressure to identify other substrates remains. This has led to the recent differentiation of a mesocortical dopaminergic projection, that appears specifically responsive to environmental stressors and is connected to the frontal lobes, disorders of which have long been associated with schizophrenia'{.
Problems with the hypothesis
These developments in identifying a subcellular site of action and a function modified by neuroleptics suggests to many a hypothesis that has accounted for most of the objections raised against it lO • However, there are further problems that at present have been less happily settled.
Latency of onset of clinical effect
One of these is the apparent latency to onset of therapeutic efficacy of treatment with neuroleptics. Commonly D2 receptor blockade occurs immediately after the administration of neuroleptics but clinical improvement may be delayed several weeks. Similarly a decline in prolactin release following the discontinuation of neuroleptics occurs almost immediately whereas relapses of the illness may be delayed for several months or longer-", There seem to be basically three approaches towards the resolution of this problem. One has been to attempt to identify delayed onset neurochemical changes such as have been shown for beta receptor down-regulation which only occurs two weeks after the administration of antidepressants and which accordingly may plausibly be hypothesized to be in some way connected to the onset of clinical improvement17. Studies of dopamine metabolites in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) following neuroleptic treatment indicate both acute and delayed effects of neuroleptics on dopamine neurotransmission'P as do plasma dopamine metabolites'", However, as of yet there have been no close correlations between such findings and clinical response and such findings may well correlate more closely with the onset of motor side effects 18 • 20 . A second approach has been to identify brain systems on which dopamine might have important persisting or delayed onset effects. This approach has led to distinctions between the effects of neuroleptics the A9 and AlO cell bodies''! and emphasis on the lack of tolerance of AID cells projecting to the frontal cortex to dopamine antagonism 15 ,19. However, why such differential effects of neuroleptics on dopaminergic systems should bear on the issue of latency of clinical response is not immediately apparent other than by virtue of the fact that the significance of these differential effects is not understood and the latency of onset of clinical improvement remains a pressing issue.
A final approach to the problem has been to invoke the involvement of dopamine systems in learning!", The rationale for this is that as dopamine has shown to be involved in behavioural sensitization and to playa critical role in operant learning systems, the delay in the onset of neuroleptic activity may be dependent on learning processes rather than strictly neurochemical processes-", Indeed, taking this approach, Miller-" has gone somewhat further and conceptualized the disorder in schizophrenia as being a disorder of learning rather than simply a neurochemical disorder.
Dopamine excess and psychopathology
Another problem which follows on as a central implication of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia is that in some way dopaminergic hyperactivity must correlate with the psychopathological signs and symptoms of schizophrenia. In 1979, Joseph et a1. 22 put forward a model in which it was suggested that dopaminergic hyperactivity might lead to behavioural rigidity and the typical cognitive defects of schizophrenia, including delusions and hallucinations. Ridley and Baker 23 studied the effects of amphetamine on animal behaviour and noticing that it leads to a degree of autism with behavioural inflexibility suggested that these behaviours in animals are mediated by dopaminergic overactivity and can be correlated with schizophrenic autism and with the maintenance of delusional beliefs. Recently McKenna 24 has suggested that dopaminergic hyperactivity in the basal ganglia might lead to the dyskinesias and propensity to tardive dyskinesia found in schizophrenia while overactivity in the ventral striatum might lead to mannerisms and stereotypy, overactivity in the septo-hippocampal system to delusions and finally overactivity in the frontal lobe projections of dopaminergic systems would result in schizophrenic formal thought disorder.
Perhaps the most widely known contribution to this issue of correlating clinical psychopathology with cerebral dysfunction came from Crow 25 who suggested that 'positive' signs and symptoms in schizophreniadelusions, hallucinations and thought disorderconstituted a separate schizophrenic syndrome (type 1 schizophrenia) that was mediated by dopaminergic hyperactivity and was specifically responsive to neuroleptic treatment. In contrast type 2 schizophrenia, the 'negative' syndrome, was characterized by flattening of affect, poverty of thought, social withdrawal and cognitive deficits. As opposed to a psychosis this latter state had many of the hallmarks of a dementia and Crow proposed that it was an essentially independent process with a very different organic pathology -brain cell loss. He suggested that type 1 schizophrenia sometimes proceeded to type 2 schizophrenia and that when it did the illness became chronic. Restitution from type 2 schizophrenia to normality rarely if ever happened. This distinction between positive and negative syndromes has assumed a place of central importance in arguments for the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia and has become widely accepted with disagreements about the detail of which clinical features should be included in each syndrome and the relation of one syndrome to the other rather than about the validity of the basic distinction.
Prior to recent hypotheses about the nature of the positive and negative syndromes, there were a number of other quite dissimilar hypotheses. Venables and Wing 26 argued that the positive or productive side of schizophrenia commonly led to a negative state by virtue of the institutionalization visited on the schizophrenic patient. In an unstimulating environment, behaviour atrophied, it was argued. An example of another differentiation between positive and negative states can be found in a paper by Helmsley'" who suggested that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by a defective perceptual filter leaving the patient unable to regulate stimulus input from the environment. Stimulus overload led to psychosis and a natural response to this was one of retreat, leading to the negative and withdrawn behavioural state.
Detailed clinical studies are not supportive of any of these hypotheses. To date there have been four longterm follow-ups of schizophrenic patients which have looked at the incidence of various clinical features of the illness during its duration 28 -31 . All report that the negative state is not necessarily the terminal stage of a chronic schizophrenic illness, that up to 50% of chronically ill patients are characterized by the continuing presence of a positive syndrome, that schizophrenia can begin with apparently negative symptoms and signs and that restitution to normal from early negative states is possible.
To some extent these issues hinge not only different views as to the priority of positive and negative syndromes but on different uses of the terms positive and negative or defect state. As noted by a number of authors'f the inclusion of thought disorder and affective incongruity in the positive syndrome is ambiguous. Data from cluster analysis of symptoms presented by schizophrenic patients would suggest that thought and affect disorder form a separate intermediate 'disorganization' syndrome'F. Furthermore the negative or defect state present early in a schizophrenic illness, as identified by Huber et al. 29 or Kay and Opler'" for example, appears to be quite different to the defect state currently emerging in the literature 33 ,34 which appears to be associated with cognitive impairment and cell loss as evidenced by ventricular enlargement on CT scans. It can be suggested that what has been identified here is a coexistent neurodevelopmental abnormality which may predispose to schizophrenia/" which may be associated with impoverishment of social skills even prior to the onset of a florid schizophrenic illness 36 ,37 and which being an additional pathogenetic factor predisposes to chronicity'? and ultimately to a dementing process but is not a necessary component of a schizophrenic illness". Such an interpretation is supported by the increased incidence of schizophrenia found in organic cerebral illnesses generally''". This clear identification of a defect state in schizophrenia arguably has been one of the principal positive results of Crow's 1980 synthesis. But this defect state surely needs to be clearly distinguished from a negative 'affective' state often noted at the onset of a schizophrenic illness, as well as between episodes and which has been associated with a good prognosis-v'", Such distinctions led Grau et al. 4 1 to postulate that the negative state is multidimensional.
Current distinctions between positive and negative syndromes are also predicated on a further ambiguity as pointed out by Frith'" in that the identification of positive syndromes depend heavily on reports by the patient of his mental state whereas in contrast the negative syndrome is derived from observations of the patient's behavioural repertoire. The creation of two distinct syndromal clusters based on such completely different variables does not seem warranted. Had the syndromes been derived from two sets of experiential reports or two sets of behavioural observations, the resulting syndromes would have greater validity. Currently, behavioural observations across syndromes testing the poverty of thought of both positively and negatively designated patients and the attentional performances of such patients 43 • 44 do not support rigid distinctions between positive and negative syndromes.
Clinical specificity
The principal basis of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia lies in the therapeutic usefulness of neuroleptics. However, these agents in practice are not used as though they are specific to schizophrenia. They are used as a first line of treatment for manic disorders. So much is this the case that there has recently been a dopaminergic hypothesis of maniav, It is argued that amphetamine in low doses in animals produces a hyperactivity which it is argued resembles manic hyperactivity": While it can be argued that neuroleptic drugs are not as specific in their effect on mania as is lithium, both in terms of specificity to a single illness and in terms of the qualitative responses they produces", this use of neuroleptics must at least be inconvenient for a dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia.
One might try to rescue the hypothesis by suggesting a hypothesis of dopamine overactivity in psychoses'". That is that dopamine overactivity produces delusions and hallucinations regardless of the underlying condition, be it mania, schizophrenia or depression and the action of neuroleptics is an antipsychotic one of particular therapeutic usefulness in schizophrenia as this disorder is particularly liable to lead to psychotic features. There are no indications however that neuroleptics are only prescribed in mania when the patient is actively deluded or hallucinating. Furthermore, neuroleptics are used in a great number of other conditions such as behavioural disorders characterized by impulsive or explosive behaviour where behavioural control is sought with little consideration of whether the subject is deluded or not.
Further problems
To date no evidence of dopaminergic overtransmission in drug naive schizophrenics has ever been replicated. The postmortem and PET scan evidence as noted above is ambiguous. Dopamine depletion in the case of Parkinson's disease is associated with a lack of initiative and arguably schizophrenics in general are noted for their lack of initiative and willpower, rather than for an excess of such. Only a sub group of schizophrenics (40%) are made worse by psychostimulant challenges", While amphetamine is associated with the production of a paranoid psychosis, such psychoses show notable differences to schizo-Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 82 October 1989 617 phrenia in that schizophrenic thought disorder has not been identified in such states", Furthermore even when a psychotic condition is aggravated by amphetamine, the worsening of the condition does not always respond to neuroleptic treatrnent'', And finally, dopamine agonists such as L-dopa, apomorphine or bromocriptine, do not aggravate schizophrenic psychoses'". These ambiguities and the lack of specific confirmation of the hypothesis led Snyder, one of its earliest advocates, to reconsider his position"? and suggest that while there was good evidence that the antagonism of dopaminergic neurotransmission was important to the mode of action of neuroleptic drugs, the evidence in favour of a dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia is much less compelling.
Dopamine hypothesis of neuroleptic action
Focusing on the immediate behavioural effects of neuroleptics may provide a way out of these difficulties. If given in sufficient doses these drugs produce an immediate effect that has been variously described in terms of an ataractic state or a state of chemical lobectomy'" or a state of psychic indifference" that may be egosyntonic or ego dystonic'". These effects appear to happen in subjects with schizophrenia, affective disorders, a variety of personality problems, and in healthy controls. If the immediate effect is induced through a dopaminergic mechanism, the similarity of immediate effects in healthy controls and in schizophrenic subjects would imply a normal functioning of dopamine systems in schizophrenia. That this effect when it occurs is therapeutically useful in schizophrenia does not imply an abnormality of dopamine systems in schizophrenia but rather that some quality of the behavioural state induced can be put to therapeutic use in this illness.
This situation is quite unlike that of antidepressants where there are no common acute onset behavioural effects and no behavioural effects, acute or chronic, on subjects that do not have affective disorders. Arguably neuroleptics resemble cocaine or amphetamine in their immediacy of onset of behavioural effects and lack of specificity to particular conditions rather than antidepressants. The resemblance to antidepressants only lies in the delayed onset of significant clinical changes. Long-term neurochemical changes following antidepressant treatment were only sought because of the lack of common short-term neurochemical effects 17 • 51 . Had antidepressants as significant acute behavioural effects or as common a set of acute neurochemical effects as the psychostimulants or neuroleptics, there would have been no reason to postulate delayed onset neurochemical changes and therapeutic response would have been accounted for in terms of two weeks of psychomotor activation being sufficient to reverse a depressive disorder. The lack of common acute onset behavioural effects and the specificity of antidepressants to a single illness can only easily be explained in terms of an action to correct an abnormal physiological state rather than in terms of their having a primary behavioural effect. Conversely, given the striking acute onset behavioural effects of neuroleptics and their close correlation with dopamine receptor blockade and the non-specificity of this effect to any illness, there is strictly speaking, no need to look for delayed onset neurochemical changes to account for therapeutic efficacy of these agents in schizophrenia. A more parsimonious hypothesis is to suggest that neuroleptics immediately induce an ataractic state or state of psychic indifference and that several weeks in such a state is conducive to recovery.
All the evidence in favour of neuroleptic activity on dopamine receptors cited above would be consistent with such a hypothesis. From their introduction clinical observation suggested that these drugs are specifically effective in states of agitation 48 • 52 • The target symptoms for clinical usefulness for neuroleptics across diagnostic categories are those of tension, agitation and irritability'S rather than delusions and hallucinations. Such a behavioural effect might be brought about by a variety of mechanisms. There is firstly the known effects of neuroleptics on conditioned avoidance paradigms in experimental animals where they appear to inhibit the engagement of motor responses or operant behaviour with learned associations that would otherwise trigger such behaviours-". It has also been postulated that they antagonize incentive motivational systems, a hypothesis that is based on their effects on conditioned behaviour, which are to lead to extinction-like effects in learning paradigms'". These effects correlate closely with potency in blocking D2 receptors and with clinical potency. They are also of acute onset and are consistent with the induction of a state of psychic indifference in humans.
An action to induce psychic indifference would help account for the prophylactic effects of neuroleptics. As is known recent life events appear to trigger psychotic episodes in schizophrenics-" as does a domiciliary atmosphere high in expressed ernotion'". Both of these factors can be expected to increase pressure on any subject, schizophrenic or not, to account for themselves; neuroleptics seem tailor made to attenuate the impact of such pressures on vulnerable subjects. It has been argued elsewhere that it is the pressure to account for oneself and what is happening that leads to the elaboration of delusions'".
Such a mode of action, in contrast to the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia, does not imply that dopamine excess underlies the psychopathological features of schizophrenia. Accordingly, neuroleptics cannot be directly antidelusional or antihallucinatory. Why do these clinical features then commonly resolve on neuroleptics? A good deal of recent work suggests that the speed with which we come to fixed judgements of what is happening to us depends on the urgency of our situation. In states of arousal all of us are more liable to settle over-hastily for a less adequate answer than we would otherwise accept'". If this is the case reducing levels of arousal can be expected to make individuals less liable to fix on judgements that seem improbable and more likely to relinquish inappropriate or dysfunctional beliefs.
Studies of the process of recovery from delusions are pertinent here 56 • 57 • These indicate that subjects pass through a phase of holding of both appropriate and inappropriate beliefs simultaneously and after recovery show a reluctance rather than an inability to recall and talk about inappropriate beliefs. Such findings can only be explained in terms of cognitive mediation of delusions rather than their direct procession from abnormal cerebral functioning or intrinsic irrationality. Bearing on this issue are many reports which indicate that neuroleptics while containing schizophrenia do not cure it 55 • An ongoing basic process remains active. Also pertinent to the argument is the relative inefficacy of neuroleptics in delusional states not characterized by high levels of agitation and arousal, such as paranoia or the disorders with overvalued ideas'". In addition if neuroleptics are directly antidelusional would one expect such large numbers of chronic patients to have persistent delusions despite in many cases extraordinary amounts of neuroleptics? The fact that neuroleptics remain potent in curbing the agitation of such patients when they become agitated suggest that resistance to neuroleptics cannot easily be advanced to account for the persistence of their delusions.
